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Summary
In our daily life, we continuously monitor others’
behaviors and interpret them in terms of goals, inten-
tions, and reasons. Despite their central importance
for predicting and interpreting each other’s actions,
the functional mechanisms and neural circuits in-
volved in action understanding remain highly contro-
versial [1, 2]. Two alternative accounts have been
advanced. Simulation theory [3] assumes that we un-
derstand actions by simulating the observed behavior
through a direct matching process that activates the
mirror-neuron circuit [4]. The alternative interpretive
account [5] assumes that action understanding is
based on specialized inferential processes activating
brain areas with no mirror properties [1]. Although
both approaches recognize the central role of contex-
tual information in specifying action intentions, their
respective accounts of this process differ in signifi-
cant respects [1, 5–7]. Here, we investigated the role
of context in action understanding by using functional
brain imaging while participants observed an unusual
action in implausible versus plausible contexts. We
show that brain areas that are part of a network
involved in inferential interpretive processes of ration-
alization and mentalization but that lack mirror proper-
ties are more active when the action occurs in an
implausible context. However, no differential activa-
tion was found in the mirror network. Our findings sup-
port the assumption that action understanding in
novel situations is primarily mediated by an inferential
interpretive system rather than the mirror system.
*Correspondence: marcel.brass@ugent.beResults
Remarkably, humans and even young infants [4, 5] not
only can attribute goals to familiar behaviors, but—rely-
ing on situational cues—can also understand even novel
or improbable actions as intentional and goal directed
[8]. Using contextual information to identify intentions
and reasons behind observed behaviors is ubiquitous
and seems to be especially necessary when interpreting
unusual or novel actions. Imagine seeing a man at the
gate leaning toward a bell button with his forehead. If
his hands were occupied with heavy nylon sacks filled
with breakable china, we easily interpret his forehead
action as a rational means for realizing the stereotypic
goal of ringing the bell. However, if the man’s hands
were free, this differential context leads us to infer other
intentions or reasons to justify his unusual behavior. We
might attribute a different goal: He might be trying to
read the name tag under the bell. We infer further inten-
tions: Maybe he wants to entertain his on-looking child
by ringing the bell in this funny way. Alternatively, we
might infer further constraints: Maybe the man’s hands
are paralyzed. So what mechanisms and neural pro-
cesses mediate our remarkable capacity to so flexibly
interpret observed behaviors as intentional actions in
terms of goals and reasons in a variety of contexts?
One dominant approach assumes that we understand
others’ actions by internally simulating their behaviors
[4, 9, 10]. Recently, simulation theory has received new
support by the finding of mirror neurons in the premotor
cortex of the macaque monkey [11, 12]. Mirror neurons
are active when the monkey observes or executes the
same action. It has been argued that mirror neurons pro-
vide the neural basis for action understanding through
motor simulation [4, 13]. In this view, action goals are
recognized by direct mapping of the observed behavior
onto a corresponding action scheme in the observer’s
motor repertoire, whose goal is already known. Recent
fMRI and TMS research indicates that areas assumed
to constitute the human mirror system (inferior frontal
gyrus and inferior parietal cortex) are involved in tasks
requiring action understanding [6, 14]. Clearly, direct
matching provides a plausible mechanism for the quick
and effortless recognition of goals of actions that are
highly familiar to the observer. More recently, however,
it has been proposed that the premotor mirror-neuron
areas are sensitive to context effects on intention recog-
nition and are ‘‘also involved in understanding the
[‘‘global’’] intentions of others’’ in which ‘‘intention’’ is in-
terpreted ‘‘to indicate the ‘why’ of an action’’ [6, 7]. The
alternative to the motor-simulation account assumes
that action understanding is at its core an inferential pro-
cess that assigns a goal to an action by evaluating its
efficiency as an optimal means of obtaining the goal
within the specific constraints of the situation [5, 8, 15].
This model assumes that the neural mechanisms of ac-
tion understanding involve context-sensitive inferential
processes of rationalization or mentalizing that are
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The top panel illustrates an example for the implausible action (operating a light switch with the knee) in three different contexts (hands free,
hands implausibly occupied, and hands plausibly occupied). On the bottom panel, the mean plausibility rating for the three different action
contexts on a five-point rating scale (1 completely implausible, 5 completely plausible) is displayed. These ratings were provided by a different
group of 15 subjects.based on the visual processing of the stimuli [1, 2, 16, 17].
Such mechanisms have been consistently related to re-
gions along the superior temporal sulcus (STS), the tem-
poroparietal junction (TPJ), theanterior frontomediancor-
tex, and the posterior cingulate cortex [16–19], which are
brain areas lacking mirror properties. Clearly, the infer-
ence-basedmodel providesa plausible mechanism ofac-
tion interpretation when the observed behavior in a given
context is unfamiliar or improbable and when intention
recognition must rely on interpreting the action in relation
to its situational constraints (as in our examples above).
One possibility is that the basic default mechanism of
action understanding both in humans and nonhuman
primates is indeed motor simulation as it is implemented
through direct matching by the mirror-neuron system
[4]. It could be that context-sensitive inferences to ra-
tionalize actions are involved only under atypical cir-
cumstances and, even then, only in humans. However,
recent converging evidence from studying action under-
standing under variable contextual constraints in a vari-
ety of nonhuman primate species (M.J. Rochat, E. Serra,
L. Fadiga, and V. Gallese, personal communication, and
[20–22]) and domestic dogs [23] suggests that context-
sensitive efficiency-based teleological inferences [5] to
assign goals to actions might in fact constitute the basic
mechanism of action understanding shared by both
human and nonhuman species.
Up till now, the brain areas and mechanisms of action
understanding in novel situations have rarely been
investigated. Most previous studies presented highly fa-
miliar actions performed in stereotypic contexts [6]. In
contrast, the present study aimed at investigating the
neural processes underlying action understanding by
presenting subjects with unusual actions in variablecontexts in which identifying the purpose or reason for
why the particular action is performed was not obvious
but required context-based inferencing. Presenting
identical target behaviors under different situational
constraints allowed us testing differential predictions
of the mirror-neuron-based motor-simulation account
on the one hand and the inference-based model of
action understanding on the other.
Contextual effects on inferential processes involved in
action understanding have been successfully demon-
strated already in preverbal infants [5] by violation-of-
expectation paradigms [15]$ Recently, Gergely, Bekker-
ing, and Kira´ly [24] developed an experimental paradigm
to isolate the relevant component processes of action
understanding by varying the contextual constraints of
the same action demonstrating selective inferential imi-
tation of a novel-means action in 14 month olds. Here,
we adapted the basic design structure of this study for
a brain imaging paradigm to investigate in adult human
subjects whether action understanding in novel situ-
ations involves the mirror network or the inferential rea-
soning network. Participants saw unusual actions (e.g.,
operating a light switch with the knee) in three different
contexts. In the ‘‘plausible-constraint’’ context (hands
plausibly occupied), the model’s hands were occupied
(she was carrying a stack of heavy folders, Figure 1),
thus making it plausible why she had to use her knee
to operate the switch. In the ‘‘implausible-constraint’’
context (hands implausibly occupied), the model’s hands
were also occupied but in a way that provided no plausi-
ble reason for why she used her knee instead of her
hands (carrying only one light folder she could have eas-
ily liberated one hand to operate the switch). In the ‘‘no-
constraint’’ context (hands free), the model’s hands were
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light). In each condition, ten different actions (Table 1)
were presented four times each. Participants were in-
structed to identify catch trials in which the observed
movement was interrupted. We predicted that areas
involved in understanding intentional actions in a novel
situation should be more strongly activated in the ‘‘no-
constraint’’ (hands free) condition than in the ‘‘plausi-
ble-constraint’’ (hands fully occupied) condition. For
the ‘‘implausible-constraint’’ (hands partially occupied)
Table 1. Experimental Stimuli and Frequency of Presentation
Hands
Free
Hands
Im-plausibly
Occupied
Hands
Plausibly
Occupied
Opening a door 4 4 4
Switching on a light 4 4 4
Operating an elevator 4 4 4
Closing a drawer 4 4 4
Closing a cabinet door 4 4 4
Adjusting a pin board 4 4 4
Moving aside a chair 4 4 4
Moving a file in a shelf 4 4 4
Closing a box 4 4 4
Moving aside a package 4 4 4condition, we predicted activation levels to lie in between
the hands free and the hands occupied condition.
When contrasting the ‘‘no-constraint’’ with the ‘‘plau-
sible-constraint’’ condition we found significant activa-
tion (p < .05, corrected for multiple comparisons) along
the STS with one local maximum in the STS (Talairach
coordinates: x: 43, y: 227, z: 0) and a local maximum
in the posterior STS (Talairach coordinates: x: 43,
y: 235, z: 15). To investigate whether any part of the
mirror system showed an activation when no correction
for multiple comparisons was carried out, we applied an
uncorrected threshold of p < .001. Even with this liberal-
ized significance criterion, no differential activation in
the mirror system (inferior frontal cortex or inferior pari-
etal cortex) was observed. Instead, the anterior fronto-
median cortex (aFMC, Talairach coordinates: x: 7, y: 48,
z: 30) showed activity when not correcting for multiple
comparisons. To better understand the activation pat-
tern across conditions, we carried out signal-strength
analysis in the STS, the pSTS, and aFMC (Figure 2B).
The beta-value diagrams indicate that the implausible-
constraint condition shows an intermediate activation
level in all three regions of interest. Because we did
not find any significant activation in the mirror system
even when using a significance threshold uncorrected
for multiple comparisons, we carried out an additionalFigure 2. Brain Response for the Comparison of Implausible versus Plausible Actions
The top panel shows the activation foci in the superior temporal sulcus (STS) and the posterior STS. On the bottom panel, the mean beta values
for the STS, the pSTS, and the anterior fronto-median cortex are listed as a function of plausibility. Furthermore, the region-of-interest analysis
for the inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) is displayed.
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tion pattern in the mirror system (Figure 2B, last panel).
We selected a coordinate from Iacoboni and colleagues’
study [6] that was related to understanding the intention
of others. This coordinate is located in the right inferior
frontal gyrus (IFG, x: 46, y: 20, z: 22), an area that was
assumed to be part of the mirror system. A paired-sam-
ples t test did not reveal a statistical reliable difference
between the plausible-constraint condition and the no-
constraint condition (t = .27, p = .79) nor between any
other condition. In order to demonstrate that the inferen-
tial network is more strongly involved in action under-
standing than the mirror system, we carried out region
(STS, pSTS, or aFMC versus IFG) by condition (hands
free, hands partially occupied, and hands fully occupied)
interactions. A significant interaction was found when
comparing the STS with the IFG (F = 5.18, p < .05)
and when comparing the pSTS with the IFG (F = 3.44,
p < .05). A marginally significant interaction was found
when comparing the aFMC with the IFG (F = 2.73,
p = .08).
Discussion
Our data strongly support the inference-based account
of action understanding in novel situations, which in-
volves rationalization as a function of contextual con-
straints. When comparing a situation where an unusual
action was highly implausible with one where the same
action was very plausible, we found strong and reliable
activations along the STS and a less reliable activation
in the aFMC. The posterior STS and the aFMC have
been previously related to perception of social stimuli,
mentalizing, and action understanding [16, 25]. In con-
trast, no differential activation was found in the mirror
network as a function of context-based plausibility of
the observed action.
At first sight, these findings seem to contradict recent
studies showing an involvement of the mirror circuit in
action understanding [4, 6, 14]. However, a crucial differ-
ence in the types of stimuli presented in these studies
might be responsible for their differential findings.
Whereas the former studies always depicted highly
familiar actions in their stereotypic contexts, all the
actions shown in the present study were unusual and
were performed in nonstereotypic contexts of varying
plausibility. We assume that the action-understanding
processes triggered by these two types of actions are
qualitatively different. Identifying the goal of a familiar
action observed in its stereotypic context can be easily
and automatically achieved by mapping it onto the cor-
responding motor representations already present in
the observer’s action schemes. In contrast, inferring
the purpose of an unusual action and the reason why it
is performed in an implausible context necessitates
a great deal of active inferencing to evaluate the effi-
ciency of the action in relation to its situational con-
straints. Our finding that the degree of context plausibil-
ity of the same action predicted differential activation of
brain areas with no mirror properties, which are normally
involved in inferential processing during rationalization
and mentalization tasks, supports the above hypothe-
sis. In the hands-free condition, participants must have
been working hard to infer an acceptable reason tojustify why the model used her knee rather than her
free hands to switch on the light. The low plausibility rat-
ings support this interpretation. We suggest that in con-
trast to most previous studies, the present experiment
captures a crucial type of context-sensitive inferential
activity (rationalization) that is necessary for a generative
understanding of intentional actions across variable
contexts [5]. The data are also consistent with recent
demonstrations that an incongruent relation of action
and context leads to activation in the posterior STS [18].
Interestingly, the same experimental design we adap-
ted here to fMRI has been used recently to investigate
understanding rational action in preverbal infants [24]
as well as in several nonhuman species (M.J. Rochat,
E. Serra, L. Fadiga, and V. Gallese, personal commu-
nication, and [20–23]). These studies indicate that
context-sensitive action-interpretation processes that
involve evaluating efficiency of goal attainment as
a function of situational constraints are not restricted
to human adults but occur already in preverbal infants
and seem present in other species as well. Whether
the neural circuit identified here overlaps with that in-
volved in action understanding in preverbal infants or
in nonhuman animals remains an open question.
Finally, we wish to stress that our results in accor-
dance with a recent study by de Lange and colleagues
(F.P. de Lange, M. Spronk, R.M. Willems, I. Toni, and
H. Bekkering, personal communication) do not exclude
the possibility that the mirror network is involved in ac-
tion understanding. However, the mirror network seems
to play a role only in situations in which no active infer-
ential processing is required to identify the goal of the
observed behavior because both the action and its ste-
reotypic context are highly familiar and map onto corre-
sponding motor schemes already represented in the ob-
server’s action repertoire. This limits the explanatory
value of simulation theory to a specific subclass of be-
haviors, namely to familiar actions performed in stereo-
typic contexts.
Experimental Procedures
Participants
Sixteen participants (eight males, eight females, mean age: 25.5)
participated in the experiment. One participant (female) was
excluded because of the high number of errors in catch trials. The
remaining fifteen participants had normal or corrected-to-normal
vision. None of the subjects had a history of neurological, major
medical, or psychiatric disorders. All were right handed, as as-
sessed by the Edinburgh Inventory.
Design
Participants were lying in the MRI scanner while watching short
video clips on TFT googles (VisuaStim XGA, Magnetic Resonance
Technologies, Northridge, USA). Each video clip was approximately
7 s long. The relevant leg action started approximately after 2.5 s.
The video clips depicted ten different situations in three different
contexts (see Table 1). Each video clip was presented four times.
Hence, the absolute number of experimental trials was 120 (ten sit-
uations 3 three conditions 3 four repetitions). In addition, 12 catch
trials were inserted randomly. Catch trials consisted of videos that
were interrupted before the movement ended. Finally, 40 null events,
which consisted of a blank screen presented for the whole trial
length, were inserted. The trial length was 10 s, starting with a vari-
able jitter interval of 0 ms, 500 ms, 1000 ms, or 1500 ms. Trials were
presented randomly.
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The experiment was carried out on a 3T scanner (Siemens TRIO,
Erlangen, Germany). Twenty axial slices (19.2 cm FOV, 64 3 64
matrix, 4 mm thickness, 1 mm spacing), parallel to the AC-PC plane
and covering the whole brain, were acquired with a single-shot, gra-
dient-recalled EPI sequence (TR 2000 ms, TE 30 ms, 90 flip angle).
Prior to the functional runs, 20 corresponding anatomical MDEFT sli-
ces and 20 EPI-T1 slices were acquired. Slice thickness was 4 mm
with a 1 mm gap.
FMRI Analysis
Analysis of fMRI data was performed with the LIPSIA software pack-
age. Data were filtered with a spatial Gaussian filter with sigma = 0.8.
A temporal high-pass filter with a cutoff frequency of 1/80 Hz was
used for baseline correction. In addition, a global scaling was carried
out. All functional data sets were individually registered into 3D
space with the participants’ individual high-resolution anatomical
images. The 2D anatomical MDEFT slices, geometrically aligned
with the functional slices, were used for computing a transformation
matrix containing rotational and translational parameters that regis-
ter the anatomical slices with the 3D reference T1 data set. These
transformation matrices were normalized to the standard Talairach
brain size by linear scaling and finally applied to the individual func-
tional data. The statistical evaluation was carried out with the gen-
eral linear model for serially autocorrelated observations. The
design matrix for event-related analysis was created with a model
of the hemodynamic response with a variable temporal delay. The
onset of the hemodynamic response was placed on the onset of
the video clip (we tested also a model in which the onset of the he-
modynamic response was modeled from the onset of the leg move-
ment; however, the results revealed the same activation pattern).
The model equation was convolved with a Gaussian kernel with
a dispersion of 4 s FWHM. Contrast maps were generated for each
participant. We computed a one-sample t test of contrast maps
across participants (random-effects model) to ascertain whether
observed differences between conditions were significantly differ-
ent. Subsequently, t values were transformed into z scores. To pro-
tect against false positive activations, we used a double-threshold
approach, that is, combining a voxel-based threshold with a mini-
mum cluster size [26]. This nonarbitrary voxel cluster size was deter-
mined with the program AlphaSim (http://afni.nimh.nih.gov/afni/
doc/manual/AlphaSim). On the basis of a Monte Carlo simulation
(1000 iterations), with our brain volume and an individual voxel
height threshold of Z > 2.57 (p < 0.005, uncorrected), it could be
determined that a cluster size of 1674 mm3 (62 contiguous voxels)
ensured an overall image-wise false-positive rate of 5%. Activations
exceeding this double threshold are therefore considered to be
activated at an experiment-wise threshold of p < .05, corrected for
multiple comparisons. We carried out the signal-strength analysis
by extracting the mean beta value from the most activated voxel
and determined the six adjacent voxels from the mean contrast
across participants (superior temporal sulcus, posterior superior
temporal sulcus, and anterior frontomedian cortex). Furthermore,
we did the same signal-strength analysis in a ROI taken from Iaco-
boni and colleagues [6].
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